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Abstract Displaced reference is the ability to refer to an
item that has been moved (displaced) in space and/or time, and
has been called one of the true hallmarks of referential com-
munication. Several studies suggest that nonhuman primates
have this capability, but a recent experiment concluded that in
a specific situation (absent entities), human infants display
displaced reference but chimpanzees do not. Here, we show
that chimpanzees and bonobos of diverse rearing histories are
capable of displaced reference to absent and displaced objects.
It is likely that some of the conflicting findings from animal
cognition studies are due to relatively minor methodological
differences, but are compounded by interpretation errors.
Comparative studies are of great importance in elucidating the
evolution of human cognition; however, greater care must be
taken with methodology and interpretation for these studies to
accurately reflect species differences.
Keywords Displacement  Reference  Primate 
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Introduction
Displacement, in the linguistic sense, is the use of a gesture
or symbol to refer to an item that is removed in space and/
or time. The ability to use displacement is frequently cited
as one of several marks of ‘‘true reference’’ (e.g., Cronk
2004; Hockett 1960; Morford and Goldin-Meadow 1997).
The distinction, according to language theorists, is that
when an item is displaced (most particularly when the item
is out of view), both the symbol and the referent are con-
structed completely within the mental plane. Displaced
reference also requires a social dyad (minimally) to have a
common frame of reference, for example, a common lan-
guage, or in the case of a deictic point, a common under-
standing of the gesture’s communicative meaning (e.g.,
Clark 1996). Displacement, more specifically displaced
reference, therefore, is one index of socio-cognitive com-
plexity, such as that required for learning language.
Many previous studies have found that chimpanzees
communicate about visibly displaced objects (e.g., Leavens
et al. 2004; Woodruff and Premack 1979) and show
excellent understanding of displacement in a variety of
experimental contexts (reviewed by Call 2001). For
instance, Woodruff and Premack (1979) showed that
chimpanzees informed a human about the location of hid-
den food and also developed deceptive communications if
that human had proven untrustworthy. Some nonprimate
vertebrates, such as dolphins, sea lions, and parrots (e.g.,
Herman and Forestell 1985; Pepperberg 1999; Pepperberg
and Gordon 2005; Schusterman et al. 1993), also have been
found to refer to absent entities. In the most extensive
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experimental test concerning absent reference, Herman and
Forestell (1985) showed that a bottlenose dolphin could
respond to one paddle to indicate the presence of an object
and to another to indicate its absence. Therefore, it is clear
from the existing literature that apes and other mammals
have the ability for displacement.
It is notable that many of the subjects in the above
examples have been given prior experiences relevant to
displacement. Chimpanzees and bonobos that have acquired
symbol systems routinely exhibit displacement in their
daily linguistic communication, much the same as human
children when they develop language (e.g., Brakke and
Savage-Rumbaugh 1996; Gardner et al. 1989; Lyn 2008;
Rumbaugh 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993, 1978,
1986). In all of these cases, apes refer to items that are out of
view. In many cases, comprehension and use of displace-
ment is both referential and flexible (Lyn 2010, 2012; Lyn
et al. 2010, 2011). For example, Lyn et al. (2011) detailed
many instances of declarative utterances in chimpanzees
and bonobo for items that were out of view, as well as
events that happened in the past or were planned for the
future. Similarly, when tested under experimental condi-
tions, many, but not all, laboratory chimpanzees request
hidden food (Herrmann et al. 2007; Russell et al. 2011).
In a recent comparative experiment, Liszkowski et al.
(2009) concluded that chimpanzees do not have displaced
reference but that human 12-month-old infants do and
attributed this either to the apes’ lack of language or lack of
prerequisite socio-cognitive skills. These findings are
unexpected due to the prevalence of reports of displaced
reference in nonhuman animals, and the fact that some apes
have the ability to use symbol systems comparable to that
of human infants’ early language. Moreover, in the Lisz-
kowski et al. (2009) study, the nature of the referent’s
absence was unclear, allowing questions to be raised about
whether even the human infants in that study exhibited
reference to an absent object. Here, we conducted a study
that tested apes’ abilities to refer to displaced and truly
absent objects, and tested some apes that used symbol
systems. By directly addressing the methodological issues
that were problematic in the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study,
we expect to clarify the different interpretations about the
presence of and skills underlying apes’ capability for
displacement.
One such interpretive difficulty stems from the contex-
tual meaning of ‘‘absent,’’ and its relevance to displace-
ment. In the Liszkowski et al. (2009) study, human infants
and the chimpanzees were trained to expect desirable
objects at Location A (an elevated platform to the side of a
small central table). In the ‘‘Absent’’ condition, the object
was removed from Location A and placed in a food cache
that was hidden behind and under the table, at the feet of
the experimenter. Therefore, in their absent condition, all
participants witnessed the visible displacement of the
object from the vicinity of Location A to the food cache. It
is our interpretation that the chimpanzees, but not the
human infants, actually tracked the movement of the
desirable object: the chimpanzees, but not the humans,
pointed to the central location where the desirable object
actually was located. The human infants continued to point
to Location A, where the desirable location had habitually
been located and Liszkowski et al. (2009) interpreted only
the human infant behavior as displaced reference.
Any interpretation of differential responses to occluded
compared to absent objects is problematic in the Lisz-
kowski et al. study because the referents, the desirable
objects, were never absent at any time in any of the
experimental procedures—in all trials, they were fully
present, but simply occluded in different manners. In the
condition labeled ‘‘occluded,’’ the object was placed
underneath a bowl at Location A. In the condition labeled
absent, the object was placed inside a food cache and
placed underneath and behind the table at the experi-
menter’s feet (in the middle of the testing area).
Importantly, the number of chimpanzees that gestured to
the middle area (where the items were occluded in their
absent condition) was not reported by Liszkowski et al.
(2009); rather, they report only on the three chimpanzees
that eventually pointed to the absent area (the ‘‘correct’’
response)—all three first indicated the middle area (p. 657).
We suggest that the chimpanzees were requesting the food
by pointing to the actual location of the food. Consistent
with this view, in their supplementary information, Lisz-
kowski and his colleagues reported that the chimpanzees
pointed, on average, 9.2 times to the middle (where the
food cache was physically located) in the absent condition
and only 2.0 times in the occluded condition (a difference
that approached statistical significance, P = .052, p. S5).
Another possibility is that when pointing to the middle
area, the chimpanzees were requesting that the experi-
menter get the food by pointing to the experimenter. Since
the middle area contained both the experimenter and the
food cache, it cannot be determined which (if any) of these
interpretations might be correct.
We address these methodological points by designing
our study with a condition in which the desirable item is
‘‘Truly Absent,’’ that is, removed completely from the
testing area (and thus not retrievable by the experimenter)
and a second condition, in which the experimental absent
condition in Liszkowski et al. (2009) was modified. In the
original Liszkowski absent condition, the item is visible
moved to an opaque container (out of sight, but the con-
tainer remains within the test area and retrievable by the
experimenter). In the modification (our ‘‘Displaced condi-
tion’’), the food cache was placed inside a container located
to the side of the experimenter, which allowed the location
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of the food cache to be clearly delineated from the location
of the experimenter. Instead of presupposing a ‘‘correct’’
response, as in Liszkowski et al. (2009), we coded gestures
to each location (i.e., to the food cache, to the experimenter,
and to the absent area) and recorded, as well, attempts by
the apes to elicit responses from the experimenters (i.e.,
attention-getting gestures: Hopkins et al. 2007; Leavens
et al. 2010b; Taglialatela et al. 2011). Therefore, we
determined precisely the referent for communicative points
with a number of improvements, including conditions that
allowed referencing to displaced objects to be distinguished
from referencing to truly absent objects.
An additional methodological issue of the Liszkowski
et al. (2009) study concerns participants’ prior history of
engaging in pointing: the human infants were preselected
to have engaged in pointing, but the chimpanzees were not.
According to multiple reports, many but not all apes
engage in pointing behavior (Leavens et al. 1996, 2004,
2005). In particular, about 50 % of institutionalized
chimpanzees point in triadic contexts compared to 100 %
of language-trained chimpanzees (Leavens et al. 2010a;
Leavens and Bard 2011). Moreover, 100 % of language-
trained apes—including bonobos, gorillas, and orangu-
tans—point manually (Leavens et al. 2010a). It is unclear
whether the chimpanzees in the Liszkowski et al. (2009)
study were known to point prior to the experiment,
although apparently all did point at least once during the
experiment (Liszkowski, personal communication, January
11, 2011). For our study, we selected apes with a prior
history and facility with pointing as a communicative
gesture, making our sample more comparable to the human
infants tested by Liszkowski et al. (2009).
Finally, we extend the consideration of ape displacement
abilities by including a sample of a closely related species,
bonobos, from the Great Ape Trust of Iowa (GATI). No
species differences were found between chimpanzees and
bonobos in earlier studies that explored several communi-
cative and cognitive tasks (Russell et al. 2011). However,
the GATI bonobos were reared in a linguistically enriched
environment that had been shown previously to increase
comprehension of communicative signals compared to the
standard-reared apes, such as the chimpanzees reared at
research facilities or zoos (see Lyn et al. 2010; Russell et al.
2011). This opportunistic sampling permitted us to test for
the generality of behavioral outcomes between standard-
reared chimpanzees and language-competent bonobos in
the display of displaced reference.
Predictions
We expect that the apes follow and gesture toward the real
location of the food. We therefore predict that: (1) the apes
will gesture to the container of the food cache in the modified
absent condition (displaced) in which the cache is not
removed from the area; (2) in the truly absent condition, the
apes may (a) gesture to other locations—we do not neces-
sarily expect the apes to point to the food cache container in
this condition, (b) exhibit attention-getting behaviors to the
experimenter, or (c) refrain from gesturing; (3) the apes will
be less likely to gesture when the food is truly absent than
when it is displaced from its habitual location. If we follow
the predictions in Liszkowski et al. (2009) study, should the
apes gesture to the container (the habitual location) in either
condition, then we could conclude that they show displaced
reference like the human infants in Liszkowski et al. (2009).
If, however, language skills are required for displaced ref-
erence, then we would expect only the language-competent
bonobos to point to the container.
Method
Subjects
Nine chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) from the Yerkes
National Primate Research Center (YNPRC: 7 females and
2 males, age range 14–39 years) and four bonobos (Pan
paniscus) from the Great Ape Trust of Iowa (GATI: 3
females and 1 male, age range 10–39 years) served as
subjects. All 13 apes had been tested previously on a
pointing production task (Russell et al. 2011) and had
engaged in communicative pointing behavior on at least 3
out of 4 trials, with a minimum of 2 correct trials.
Procedure
All apes were tested in their home enclosures. Experi-
menter 1 sat on a stool centered approximately one meter
from the cage front. An insulated opaque cooler with a lid
(‘‘the cooler’’) held a single transparent container of food
(the ‘‘food cache’’) and was placed approximately 0.5
meters from the cage mesh on one side of Experimenter 1
(see Fig. 1). An empty, clear container was placed on top
of a second stool approximately 0.5 meters from the cage
mesh (the ‘‘container’’) on the opposite side of Experi-
menter 1 from the cooler. The locations of the cooler and
the container (left or right of Experimenter 1) were coun-
terbalanced across sessions. A second experimenter
(Experimenter 2) sat approximately one meter behind
Experimenter 1. During the displaced condition, the
experimenter would manipulate the food and then replace it
in the cooler. During the truly absent condition, after
Experimenter 1 manipulated the food item, Experimenter 2
took the food cache and left the test area through the
nearest doorway, closing the door behind her. On all trials,
the behavior of the ape was videotaped for later coding.
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Demonstrations
Trials 1–4 were demonstrations to create an expectation
that food would be in the container (as in Liszkowski et al.
2009) as follows:
When the subject was watching, Experimenter 1
removed the food cache from the cooler, took a piece of
food from inside, and placed it in the container. The
experimenter then replaced the food cache into the cooler,
picked up the piece of food from the container and gave it
to the ape to eat. The experimenter minimized eye contact
throughout the demonstration and did not acknowledge any
gestures from the ape. This routine was designed to instill
an expectation of food placement into the container.
Test trials (2 conditions)
Displaced condition
While facing the subject, Experimenter 1 took the food
cache from the cooler, took a piece of food, and began to
place the piece of food in the container as during the
demonstrations. But in this condition, the experimenter put
the piece back into the food cache and replaced the cache
in the cooler, closing the lid so that no food was visible.
This condition mimics the procedure in Liszkowski et al.
‘‘absent’’ condition, with the modification that the locations
of the food cache and the experimenter are clearly
separated.
Truly absent condition
While facing the subject, Experimenter 1 took the food
cache from the cooler, took a piece of food, and began to
place the piece of food in the container as during the
demonstrations. In this condition, Experimenter 1 put the
piece back into the food cache and handed the food cache
to Experimenter 2, who took the food and walked out of the
test area. The lid to the cooler was left open so that the
subjects could see that the cooler was empty.
Subsequent to the four demonstrations, eight trials were
run in the displaced condition and eight trials run in the
truly absent condition, counterbalanced for order across the
16 trials. Subjects were allowed 90 s in which to respond
and then, if they did not gesture, the trial was ended. If the
subject made a gesture (i.e., a point—see below for defi-
nitions) to either the cooler or the container, the trial ended.
At approximately 30, 50, and 80 s into the trial, if a given
subject did not point to the container or the cooler, then the
subject was offered vocal and gestural encouragement,
similar to the methodology of Liszkowski et al. (2009). For
example, Experimenter 1 might encourage the subject by
asking, ‘‘Do you want me to get you something?’’ while
gesturing to the two locations simultaneously.
Gestures to the experimenter were given a verbal
response (e.g., ‘‘Would you like something?’’) and the trial
continued. Again, points to either the cooler or the con-
tainer ended the trial. In the truly absent condition, when
the trial was over, Experimenter 2 retrieved the food cache
from outside the test area and gave it to Experimenter 1. At
the completion of trials in both the displaced and truly
absent conditions, Experimenter 1 took a piece of food
from the cache, placed the food in the container, and then
gave the food to the subject (repeating the demonstrations
and reinstating the expectation of food in the container).
Coding and reliability
Videotapes of the trials were coded for all communicative
gestures, defined as behaviors with a clear reference or
communicative purpose. A manual point was defined as a
deliberate extension or movement of the arm, with at least
one finger extended, that was directed toward an object, an
area, or a person without another immediate purpose, such
as probing the environment (e.g., Leavens et al. 1996).
Fig. 1 The experimental setup for each condition. Labels indicate
depictions of the container and the cooler. These locations were
counterbalanced for left and right side across the trials. The arrow in
b indicates the movement of Experimenter 2 leaving the immediate
area taking the food cache
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A lip point was defined as an extension of the lip, usually
through the cage mesh, directed toward an object, an area,
or a person. The ape’s face was directed generally toward
the experimenter or in the direction of the gesture. Lip
points were included specifically because one chimpanzee
used lip points almost exclusively when gesturing com-
municatively (see, e.g., Enfield et al. 2007; Enfield 2001;
Wilkins (2003) for discussion of lip-pointing among
humans). Manual and lip points were summed into the
category of point.
All points were coded as directed toward (1) the con-
tainer, (2) the experimenter, (3) the cooler, or (4) ‘‘Other.’’
This latter category included points directed toward
something outside the test area (e.g., high up or toward the
rear of the cage). Attention-getting behaviors, such as cage
bangs (where the ape bangs a fist or arm against the cage
material), handshakes (raising a hand and shaking it—
usually in the direction of the experimenter), or claps
(clapping both hands together) were wrapped into the other
gesture category, due to a relatively small number of other-
directed points. Occasionally, these other points appeared
to indicate the place where Experimenter 2 had left the
area. However, these points were frequently off-camera as
the camera was focused on the container, the experimenter,
and the cooler. Therefore, points toward all other areas of
the cage are categorized together as other gestures.
Reliability
All trials were coded by the first author and 23 % of the
trials were also coded for reliability assessment by an
independent coder (the second author) who was as blind as
possible to the trial type (coding started from the moment
the cooler closed or the second experimenter left and the
coders were instructed to focus on the ape only). Reliability
agreement was scored when the coders both indicated the
incidence (or lack thereof) of a gesture to a particular area.
Raters agreed on the presence of a gesture 91.7 % of the
time (Cohen’s Kappa: j = 0.83). Agreements on specific
point types were 87.5 % (Cohen’s Kappa: j = 0.75) for
gestures toward the container, 89.5 % for gestures to the
experimenter, and 91.7 % (j = 0.83) for both points to the
cooler and other gestures.
Data analysis
Repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted to determine
whether each gesture varied by condition (truly absent and
displaced) as a within-subjects variable and species
(Chimpanzee, Bonobo) as a between-subjects variable
(of course, it is important to bear in mind that in our
design, species and rearing history are confounded—we
are vcomparing standard nursery-reared chimpanzees with
environmentally enriched bonobos). Different types of
gestures provoked different responses by the experimenter,
and since some responses were not independent, individual
analyses were run for each gesture. To further explore
differential gesturing by the apes across conditions and
experimenter responses, we also ran a single repeated
measure ANOVA in which the gestures were redefined as
‘‘ending’’ points (points to the container and to the cooler
that ended the trial) or ‘‘non-ending’’ gestures (points to the
experimenter and other gestures that did not end the trial):
this was a 2 (point type) by 2 (condition) by 2 (species)
repeated measures ANOVA. This second analysis helps us
to determine whether different experimenter responses had
any systematic effects on the apes’ gestural signaling.
Results
In the displaced condition, 10/13 (77 %) of the apes
referred to the empty container at least once with no pre-
ceding points either to the experimenter or to a non-
experimental area. Similarly, 9/13 (70 %) of the apes
referred to the container in the truly absent condition.
When the apes indicated the container without preceding
points, 52 % of points in the displaced condition and 72 %
of points in the truly absent condition were initiated before
any prompts were given. Therefore, the apes fulfilled the
requisite behaviors that, according to Liszkowski et al.
(2009), warranted their conclusion that their human infants
engaged in displaced reference.
The percentage of trials in which the apes pointed to the
container is illustrated in Fig. 2. The apes did not point
differentially to the container across the conditions
(F(1,11) = 2.82, P = .12, g2 = 0.20) nor was there a main
effect of species for container-directed points
(F(1,11) = 3.62, P = .08, g2 = 0.25). Chimpanzees and
bonobos also did not differentially refer to the container
across the two conditions as there was no significant
interaction between species and condition (F(1,11) = 0.64,
P = .44, g2 = 0.055). Given the large effect size, it is
worth noting that there was a trend for the bonobos to
gesture to the container more than the chimpanzees, and a
trend for more gestures to the container to be made in the
displaced than the truly absent condition. Importantly, the
intercept of the analysis was significantly different from
zero, supporting the assertion that the apes indicated the
container more than would be expected by chance
(F(1,11) = 30.94, P \ .001). These results confirm that the
apes in our study did indicate the ‘‘food absent area,’’ the
container that usually held the food item, unlike the
chimpanzees in Liszkowski et al. (2009) study.
Importantly, 9/13 apes indicated the cooler more fre-
quently than the container in the displaced condition. For
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points to the cooler, there were no main effects of species
(F(1,11) = 0.50, P = .49, g2 = 0.04) or of condition
(F(1,11) = 2.13, P = .17, g2 = 0.16), but there was a
significant interaction between condition and species
(F(1,11) = 7.59, P = .02, g2 = 0.41; See Fig. 2). Post hoc
t tests indicate that the chimpanzees pointed to the cooler
significantly more frequently in the displaced condition
than in the truly absent condition (t(8) = 3.65, P = .006),
but the bonobos pointed to the cooler at similar rates in
both conditions (t(3) = 0.88, P = .44). This supports the
conclusion that the chimpanzees might track the actual
location of the food (the cooler), when it is present but
hidden in a new location (in the displaced condition). The
bonobos, however, gesture similarly in both conditions.
Looking at this finding in light of the possible differential
experimenter responses, the analysis of ‘‘ending’’ points
(collapsing points to the cooler and the container into a new
code of ‘‘ending points’’ and all other gestures as ‘‘non-
ending gestures’’) revealed a main effect of condition
(F(1,11) = 10.32, P = .008, g2 = 0.48) with significantly
more ending points in the displaced condition than the truly
absent condition. There was also a main effect of species
(F(1,11) = 5.33, P = 0.041, g2 = 0.33) with bonobos
making significantly more ending points overall than the
chimpanzees. However, there was a significant interaction
between condition and species (F(1,11) = 5.13, P = 0.045,
g2 = 0.32), showing that this difference in ending points
across conditions was mainly driven, again, by the differ-
ential responding of the chimpanzees.
Within the category of non-ending points, points to the
experimenter did not differ significantly across conditions
or across species (Fig. 3 panel a): there were no significant
main effects (condition: (F(1,11) = 0.47, P = .51,
g2 = 0.04); species: (F(1,11) = 0.35, P = .56, g2 = 0.03).
The interaction between condition and species was also not
significant (F(1,11) = 3.12, P = .10, g2 = 0.22), although
there was a trend in the displaced condition for the chim-
panzees, more than the bonobos, to gesture to the experi-
menter. This finding suggests that points to the
experimenter were general communicative gestures and
were therefore not differentially used across the conditions.
The difference in non-ending points, therefore, seems to be
driven by the other gestures. Bonobos made significantly
fewer other gestures overall compared with the chimpanzees:
there was a significant main effect of species (F(1,11) = 6.48,
P = .03, g2 = 0.37). There was no main effect of condition
(F(1,11) = 3.23, P = .09, g2 = 0.24), but there was a sig-
nificant interaction found in other gestures (F(1,11) = 6.17,
P = .03, g2 = 0.36; Fig. 3 panel b): Chimpanzees made
significantly more other gestures in the displaced compared to
the truly absent condition (t(8) = 3.41, P = .009), but, again,
bonobos showed no difference across conditions (t(3) = 1.00,
P = .39). Because these other gestures were primarily
attention-getting gestures (without specific referents), this
finding may again indicate that the chimpanzees were aware
of the availability of the food in the displaced condition and
therefore exerted more effort to communicate in that
condition.
To try to clarify this difference in gesturing between the
chimpanzees and bonobos, we analyzed the trials in which
Fig. 2 The mean percentage of trials in which the participants
pointed to the container or to the cooler in the each condition. Asterisk
indicates conditions are significantly different P \ .01
Fig. 3 The mean percentage of trials in which the participants made
at least one gesture to the experimenter or at least one other gesture
(points not directed at the areas or the experimenter and attention-
getting gestures). Asterisk indicates conditions are significantly
different, P \ .05
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the apes made no gesture of any kind. In these ‘‘no gesture’’
trials, there was a significant main effect of species,
(F(1,11) = 8.57, P = .015, g2 = 0.44; Fig. 4), no signifi-
cant main effect of condition (F(1,11) = 8.57, P = .015,
g2 = 0.44), and a significant interaction between condition
and species (F(1,11) = 5.81, P = .035, g2 = 0.35). These
findings were driven by the fact that the bonobos always
gestured (0 % no gesture trials for the bonobos), but the
chimpanzees gestured differentially. The chimpanzees
were significantly more likely to refrain from making any
gestures in the truly absent condition compared to the
displaced condition. This finding is perhaps the strongest
evidence that the chimpanzee displayed their understand-
ing of the unavailability of the food items.
Discussion
The results of the current study demonstrate that, contrary
to the findings of Liszkowski et al. (2009), apes do
communicate about absent entities: the apes in the current
study gestured to the empty container in both conditions,
when the desired object was visibly displaced, but still
present (as in the Liszkowski et al. (2009) ‘‘absent’’ ref-
erent condition) as well as when it was absent altogether
(our truly absent condition). The apes tested here differed
from those of Liszkowski et al. (2009) in that they indi-
cated the absent entities by pointing to the empty container
after being led to expect the desired object to be in the
container (Fig. 5).
We also found support for our hypotheses concerning
chimpanzees’ abilities to track the actual location of the
desired object, which was clarified with our methodologi-
cal changes. In particular, the chimpanzees were signifi-
cantly more likely to indicate the cooler when the food was
displaced to the cooler than when the food was actually
absent. This finding suggests that these chimpanzees track
the current location of the food and frequently gesture
toward that location. Therefore, when the chimpanzees
gestured toward the middle of the apparatus in the Lisz-
kowski et al. (2009) study, they may have been requesting
the food that had been placed there under the table. Indeed,
Liszkowski et al. reported that their ‘‘chimpanzees pro-
duced more unspecific points to the middle in the Absent
Referent condition [the condition in which the food was
actually located in the middle] than in the Occluded Ref-
erent condition’’ (2009, Supplementary Methods, p. S5).
We predicted that the apes would be less likely to ges-
ture to the experimenter or make attention-getting gestures
when the desired object had been removed entirely from
the testing environment, but this hypothesis was only par-
tially supported. We did find that the chimpanzees, but not
the bonobos, refrained from gesturing when the desired
object was truly absent from the test area, but the bonobos
were just as likely to gesture in both conditions. Perhaps,
this is due to their differential pre-experimental histories:
the chimpanzees lived in a standard laboratory setting,
where it was often the case that food was carried away and,
once removed, it would usually not be returned. In contrast,
the bonobos lived in an environment enriched with a
symbol system and with caregivers who often would
respond positively to requests for food to be returned after
it had been carried away. The bonobos also had pre-
experimental communicative interactions about items that
were not just out of sight, but had happened in the past or
were planned for the future (Lyn et al. 2011; Brakke and
Savage-Rumbaugh 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986).
Although several studies have shown that apes reared in a
socio-linguistic environment have a better understanding of
communicative points by their caregivers (see Lyn 2010;
Lyn et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2011), we do not have any
evidence that this impacted performance in this displace-
ment task.
Fig. 4 The mean percentage of trials in which the participants made
no gesture of any kind. Asterisk indicates conditions are significantly
different, P \ .05
Fig. 5 The percentage of participants in each study (our displaced
condition compared to Lizscowski et al. equivalent absent condition)
that either: pointed to the absent area at least once without preceding
points to another location, pointed to the absent area with preceding
points to another location, or never pointed to the absent area
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These findings seem to contradict the recent findings by
Liszkowski et al. (2009) that showed that chimpanzees did
not indicate containers of absent food, even after multiple
trials. However, those chimpanzees did indicate the
experimenter and/or the location of the hidden food—also
‘‘following the food’’ as we have shown here. However,
unlike the Liszkowski et al. (2009) chimpanzees, the apes
in the present study also indicated the container, meeting
Liszkowski et al.’s operational criterion for communicating
about absent entities. In addition, these responses were
sometimes their first gestural response and were made
before any cues were given—both requirements for dis-
placed referential indication according to Liszkowski et al.
(2009). Our results demonstrate that, with just a slight
modification of the physical layout, the apes performed
more similarly to the children and less like the chimpan-
zees in the study by Liszkowski et al. (2009) (Fig. 5).
However, it is important to point out the differences
between the language-using bonobos and the language-
naive chimpanzees in our study. While the chimpanzees
did indicate the container and did so without previous
points, this type of response was less frequent in the
chimpanzee group than in the bonobo group in both con-
ditions (approaching significance; P = .08). It is possible
that with an increased sample of language-using apes, this
difference would be significant. These results and the dif-
ferences noted above are consistent with our previous
findings that rearing and living environment greatly affect
the cognitive and communicative capacities of apes (Lyn
2010; Lyn et al. 2010; Russell et al. 2011; Leavens and
Bard 2011; Leavens et al. 2010b). However, in the current
study, the species variable is confounded with rearing
differences, so further research is required to distinguish
the cause of these differences.
These findings exemplify the problematic interpretations
of some types of cross-species experiments (Boesch 2007;
Mulcahy and Call 2009). We know from studies of both
human children (e.g., Dea´k et al. 2000; Moore and D’En-
tremont 2001) and nonhumans (e.g., Hattori et al. 2010)
that even minor changes in physical context can lead to
large changes in response characteristics (see also Boesch
2007, 2008). Frequently, these methodological changes are
not recognized, and so interpretation of the data is prob-
lematic; it is not uncommon that behavioral differences
between representatives of different species are attributed
to differences in evolutionary histories when, in fact, these
differences are confounded with substantial differences in
the organisms’ pre-experimental experiences and in
experimental procedures (Leavens and Bard 2011).
When comparing humans and nonhuman primates,
researchers frequently sample representatives from different
species, at different ages, with dissimilar pre-experimental
social histories, and, if they find a difference, frequently
interpret that difference as evidence for human cognitive
superiority (Leavens et al. 2008). For example, Tomasello
and Call (1997) in noting evidence that young human chil-
dren imitated demonstrated actions more faithfully than
chimpanzees (e.g., Whiten et al. 1996), referred to the former
response pattern as ‘‘true imitation’’ and the latter as mere
‘‘emulation.’’ According to Tomasello and Call (1997), only
‘‘true imitation’’ implied that the participants understood the
intentionality of the demonstrator. However, recently
Horowitz (2003) demonstrated that human adults acted more
like the chimpanzees, emulating rather than directly imitat-
ing the behavior of a model, contradicting the assumptions of
Tomasello and Carpenter’s (2005) cognitive model.
Similarly, Povinelli et al. (1999) demonstrated that chim-
panzees used the gaze direction of human demonstrators to
find food more effectively than did younger human children in
an experimental condition in which the experimenter’s gaze
was directed away from a baited container, but directed
toward the correct hemispace. The chimpanzees’ superior
performance in this condition was interpreted by Povinelli
et al. (1999) as evidence for inferior cognitive representations
of visual perspective. However, Thomas et al. (2008) showed
that human adults responded more like the chimpanzees under
these experimental conditions. Again, apes’ performance was
incorrectly interpreted as evidence for cognitive inferiority on
the basis of a difference in behavior.
Thus, apart from the difficulty in creating equivalent
methodological procedures for humans and chimpanzees,
there appears to be a bias toward interpreting chimpanzee
responses as inferior to human responses whenever they
merely differ. This highlights the difficulty in elucidating
cognitive mechanisms, particularly when experiments use
flawed sampling procedures or have little control over
subject variables, (e.g., Bulloch et al. 2008; Furlong et al.
2008; Hostetter et al. 2007; Leavens et al. 2008; Thomas
et al. 2008). There is little question that future cross-species
studies are of tremendous importance in further delineating
the evolution of human cognition. However, any conclu-
sions drawn from these studies must withstand close
methodological and interpretive scrutiny.
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